Malicious code ran on BBC, CNN and Zoom sites through Optimizely: what to check if you visited Nov 15–16

Cybersecurity

Quick answer: Sites run by 178 organizations, including the BBC, CNN and Zoom, served malicious JavaScript through Optimizely on Nov 16. The code swapped crypto wallet addresses, skimmed cards typed into the sites’ own forms, and tried to exploit older iPhones and iPads. Update iOS or iPadOS, check card statements, and double-check crypto transfers from that window. (Report URI, Nov 16)

Affected: Visitors to websites that loaded an Optimizely Web Experimentation snippet from the night of Nov 15 into Nov 16, 2026. Report URI found malicious code in 188 of 1,611 Optimizely snippet files, belonging to 178 organizations, including the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce and GitLab. Site owners who use Optimizely Web are also in scope. Fix: Optimizely says it fixed a vulnerability “in the Experimentation account signup flow,” removed the injected code, and notified all affected customers (Optimizely statement to BleepingComputer; Optimizely status page). Report URI says all the infected files it was watching were clean as of 5:11 PM CT Nov 16. Exploited yet? Yes. Malicious JavaScript was served to visitors on Nov 16, and cryptocurrency had already been stolen, with verified transactions to the attackers, per Report URI (Scott Helme), Nov 16.

What happened

Optimizely Web has each customer load a JavaScript snippet, usually from Optimizely’s own servers. That file can include Project JavaScript: custom code added in the Optimizely dashboard, which then runs on every page that loads the snippet. Report URI, the company run by Scott Helme, says an attacker wrote their own code into that section and left the rest of each snippet alone. The file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com, a host those sites already trusted. Self-hosted snippets, and the snippets for optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com, were affected too. This was not a CDN cache-poisoning attack.

Report URI fetched 1,611 distinct Optimizely snippets and found malicious code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organizations, including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. It says the real number is likely higher, because it could only check snippets it could find in time.

The first injection it saw was in the BBC’s snippet at 10:21 PM CT on Nov 15 (4:21 AM UTC Nov 16). Report URI says all the infected files it was watching were clean by 5:11 PM CT on Nov 16 (23:11 UTC), and that they have stayed clean since.

In a statement to BleepingComputer, Optimizely said an unauthorized party “exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow” and used it “to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects.” It said it blocked the path, deployed a fix, removed the injected code, reset affected accounts, and “notified all affected customers.” Its status page, posted at 7:02 PM CT on Nov 16, uses broader wording: a vulnerability “in Experimentation.” As of the morning of Nov 17, the incident was still listed as Monitoring. It does not say how many projects were changed.

What the code did

The payload came from the attacker-controlled domain 1688360.cc. What a visitor hit depended on their device and what they did on the page.

The script replaced valid cryptocurrency wallet addresses with the attacker’s, including in page text, form fields, the clipboard and outgoing requests. Copy an address while an affected tab is open, and you may paste the attacker’s instead. Report URI recorded about $7,040 in the attacker’s wallets as of 1:25 PM CT on Nov 16. Those figures are on-chain receipts only.

A card skimmer was added at 7:43 AM CT on Nov 16. It watched a site’s own form fields for a card number, expiry date and CVV. Cards entered in hosted payment frames from processors such as Stripe and Adyen were out of its reach. Cards typed into a site’s own form fields were not. When it swapped an address next to wallet or payment wording, it also tried to send the page URL, cookies not marked HttpOnly, and a screenshot of the page.

On iPhones and iPads, the script loaded the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits. Report URI says Coruna was aimed at iOS 13 through 17, and DarkSword at iOS 18. The kits’ own comments say iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, are patched. That is the kits talking, not an Apple advisory. Update to the latest iOS or iPadOS your device can run.

Am I affected?

Visiting an affected site does not mean you were automatically infected, and it does not mean the site’s own servers were broken into. The change sat in the site’s Optimizely project. If you typed a card into a site’s own form after about 7:43 AM CT on Nov 16, copied a crypto address on an affected page, or used an outdated iPhone or iPad, take the steps below.

What to do now

If you visited an affected site:

  1. Update your iPhone or iPad to the latest iOS or iPadOS available for that device.
  2. Check card statements for Nov 16, and for the late evening of Nov 15 if you were on an affected site after 10:21 PM CT.
  3. Double-check any crypto transfer from that window. Confirm the destination address through a channel you already trust.
  4. Watch for unusual sign-ins or account changes on services you were using while the page was open.

If you run a site that uses Optimizely Web:

  1. Open every project’s Project JavaScript and every experiment’s custom code. Search for 1688360.cc and for atob(. A search for the domain alone will miss the version that hid the URL in base64.
  2. Review who has edit access (users, API tokens and integrations) and rotate those credentials.
  3. Treat secrets in cookies not marked HttpOnly as exposed, and rotate them.
  4. If your site has card fields in its own forms, treat cards entered on Nov 16 as possibly exposed.
  5. Tighten your Content Security Policy. Restrict connect-src, and avoid 'unsafe-eval' where you can. Allowing cdn.optimizely.com is not enough, because the bad code arrived from that host. Of 159 organizations Report URI scored, 24 blocked the payload; 68 had no CSP at all.

What we still don’t know

Nobody has published a victim count. Report URI cannot see how many cards, cookies, screenshots or iOS devices were hit. Optimizely has not published its own count of affected projects, and has not explained how a signup-flow flaw let the attacker edit existing customers’ projects.

Sources

AltTab Dad